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Ò³ðîëü Æ.. Ðèíêè ³ ðèíêîâà âëàäà: Òåîð³ÿ îðãàí³çàö³¿ ïðîìèñëîâîñò³ / Ïåð. ç àíãë. ÑÏá. : Åêîíîì³÷íà øêîëà., 1996 - ïåðåéòè äî çì³ñòó ï³äðó÷íèêà

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  1. Áààø Å.. ²ñòîð³ÿ åêîíîì³÷íîãî ðîçâèòêó Ãîëëàí䳿 XVI-XVIII ñò. Ì.: ²íîçåìíà ë³òåðàòóðà. - 397 ñ., 1949

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      âèçíà÷àºòüñÿ ïîñòàâëåíèìè ö³ëÿìè ³ çàâäàííÿìè. Äèñåðòàö³ÿ ñêëàäàºòüñÿ ç âñòóïó, òðüîõ ðîçä³ë³â, âèñíîâê³â, äâîõ äîäàòê³â ³ ñïèñêó âèêîðèñòàíî¿ ë³òåðàòóðè. Ó ïåðøîìó ðîçä³ë³ äîñë³äæóþòüñÿ ñèñòåìí³ â³äíîñèíè â òåðì³íîëî㳿 ô³íàíñîâî¿ çâ³òíîñò³. Ó äðóãîìó ðîçä³ë³ ïðîâîäèòüñÿ ì³æìîâíå ç³ñòàâëåííÿ òåðì³í³â ô³íàíñîâî¿ çâ³òíîñò³ íà ôîðìàëüíî-ñåìàíòè÷íîìó ð³âí³. Ó òðåòüîìó ðîçä³ë³ ñèñòåìàòèçóþòüñÿ
  4. Îñíîâíà ðåêîìåíäîâàíà ë³òåðàòóðà 1.
      Êóçüáîæåâ Å. Í., Êîçüåâà ². À., Ñâåòîâöåâà Ì. Ã. Åêîíîì³÷íà ãåîãðàô³ÿ ³ ðåã³îíàë³ñòèêà. Ì.: Âèùà îñâ³òà, 2007 2. Ñèìàãèí Þ. À. Òåðèòîð³àëüíà îðãàí³çàö³ÿ íàñåëåííÿ ³ ãîñïîäàðñòâà. Ì.: Êíîðóñ, 2008 3.Åêîíîì³÷åñêàÿ òà ñîö³àëüíà ãåîãðàô³ÿ Ðîñ³¿. Ïîä ðåä. ÕðóùåâàÀ. Ò. Ì.: Äðîôà, 2007 ²íøà ë³òåðàòóðà 1. Ââåäåííÿ â åêîíîì³÷íó ãåîãðàô³þ ³ ðåã³îíàëüíó åêîíîì³êó Ðîñ³¿. Ïîä ðåä.
  5. ªâãåí Ïàðøàêîâ. Åêîíîì³÷íèé ðîçâèòîê ñóñï³ëüñòâà / Êîíöåïö³ÿ êîîïåðàòèâíîãî ñîö³àë³çìó. ²ñòîðè÷íå äîñë³äæåííÿ. - Çàïîð³ææÿ: Äèêå Ïîëå,. - 264 ñ., 1997

  6. ÒÅÌÀ «Á³çíåñïëàíóâàííÿ»
      Ïèòàííÿ ñåì³íàðñüêîãî çàíÿòòÿ: Îïåðàòèâíèé á³çíåñïëàí. Ñèñòåìà äåðæàâíîãî ðåãóëþâàííÿ ðèíêîâîãî ãîñïîäàðñòâà ³ ñòèìóëþâàííÿ ðîçâèòêó á³çíåñó. Çàïèòàííÿ ³ çàâäàííÿ äëÿ êîíòðîëþ: Ðîçêðèéòå çì³ñò îêðåìèõ ÷àñòèí áèçíåñïëàíà, ³ ç ÿêîþ ìåòîþ â³í ñêëàäàºòüñÿ â òîðã³âë³? ßêèé åòàï ñêëàäàííÿ áèçíåñïëàíà º íàéâàæëèâ³øèì? ×îìó ëèøå äåÿê³ êîììåðñàíòûïðåäïðèíèìàòåëè ñêëàäàþòü
  7. 4.3.1. Çíà÷åííÿ ä³ëîâî¿ ë³òåðàòóðè â àíàë³ò³÷åñêîéðàáîòå
      Âñ³ çíàííÿ ³ äîñâ³ä, çà³ìñòâóåìèå â ³íøèõ îñ³á, ïîâèíí³ áóòè â³äíåñåí³ äî çàãàëüíîãî êëàñó "â³äîìîñòåé äðóãîãî ïîðÿäêó", àæ í³ÿê íå òîìó, ùî âîíè ìåíø ³ñòîòí³, à ïðîñòî â³ä òîãî, ùî âîíè çäîáóò³ äîñë³äíèêîì áåçïîñåðåäíüî íå â ðåçóëüòàò³ îñîáèñòîãî äîñâ³äó, ñâî¿õ ñïîñòåðåæåíü àáî ðîçðàõóíê³â . Ó á³ëüøîñò³ âèïàäê³â äîñë³äæåííÿ çíà÷íî ïðîãðàëî á, ÿêáè àíàë³òèê ïîêëàäàâñÿ ò³ëüêè íà âëàñíó
  8. ÒÅÌÀ «ÎÐÃÀͲÇÀÖ²ß ÁÅÇÏÅÊÈ ÎÏÒÎÂÎÃÎ ÒÎÐÃÎÂÎÃΠϲÄÏÐȪÌÑÒÂÀ»
      Ïèòàííÿ ñåì³íàðñüêîãî çàíÿòòÿ: Ïëàí çàáåçïå÷åííÿ áåçïåêè. Îðãàí³çàö³ÿ ñèñòåìè êîíòðîëþ çà äîñòàâêîþ òà çáåðåæåííÿì òîâàð³â. Çàïèòàííÿ ³ çàâäàííÿ äëÿ êîíòðîëþ: Ùî òàêå ïëàí çàáåçïå÷åííÿ áåçïåêè îïòîâîãî òîðãîâîãî ï³äïðèºìñòâà ³ ÿêà éîãî ðîëü? Ïåðåðàõóéòå îñíîâí³ åòàïè îðãàí³çàö³¿ áåçïåêè â îïòîâîìó òîðãîâåëüíîìó ï³äïðèºìñòâ³ ³ äàéòå õàðàêòåðèñòèêó êîæíîìó ç íèõ. ˳òåðàòóðà: îñíîâíà (1,4,5)
  9. Çàãàëüíèé îáñÿã âèá³ðêè
      ñêëàâ 3229 âèïàäê³â âæèâàííÿ òåðì³í³â ó ð³çíèõ êîíòåêñòàõ. Âèä³ëåíî 1000 òåðì³í³â ô³íàíñîâî¿ çâ³òíîñò³ òà 80 êâàç³òåðì³íîâ (ñò³éêèõ ñëîâîñïîëó÷åíü òåðì³íîëîã³÷íîãî õàðàêòåðó, ùî ôîðìóþòü îñíîâí³ ñòàòò³ ô³íàíñîâèõ çâ³ò³â òà âèêîðèñòîâóþòüñÿ â òåêñò³ ð³÷íîãî çâ³òó). Äëÿ àíàë³çó çíà÷åíü òåðì³í³â ³ ï³äáîðó åêâ³âàëåíò³â âèêîðèñòîâóâàâñÿ ðÿä ñëîâíèê³â: Àíãëî-ðîñ³éñüêèé ñëîâíèê ç åêîíîì³êè òà
  10. 2.2. Îñíîâí³ ìåòîäîëîã³÷í³ ï³äõîäè äî äîñë³äæåííÿ îðãàí³çàö³îííîéêóëüòóðè
      Äî òåïåð³øíüîãî ÷àñó â íàóêîâ³é ë³òåðàòóð³ ñêëàëàñÿ áåçë³÷ ìåòîäîëîã³÷íèõ ï³äõîä³â äî äîñë³äæåííÿ ôåíîìåíó îðãàí³çàö³éíî¿ êóëüòóðè. Âîíè â³äð³çíÿþòüñÿ áåçïîñåðåäíüîþ ñïðÿìîâàí³ñòþ íà äîñë³äæóâàíèé ïðåäìåò, àáî äàþòü éîãî ñïåöèô³÷íó ³íòåðïðåòàö³þ (íàïðèêëàä, ñèñòåìíèé ï³äõ³ä), àáî îð³ºíòóþòü íà îñîáëèâèé ï³äõ³ä äî íüîãî (ïîð³âíÿëüíèé ï³äõ³ä). Íå ïðåòåíäóþ÷è íà ïîâíèé ðîçãëÿä óñ³õ ³ñíóþ÷èõ
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